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While the world has met some targets for Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) already, many Sub-Saharan African
countries are set to miss most of their targets because they started
with the worst initial conditions. By controlling for initial conditions,
this study assesses 1) development efforts, 2) MDG progress, and
3) the relationship between efforts and progress. For the third
assessment, this study measures state capacity and provides an
objective indicator for governance. The evaluation shows that
efforts in many sectors increase after the MDGs but this does not
necessarily contribute to outcomes.
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1  Introduction
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) include a set of numerical and time-
bound targets, with the deadline of 2015, for eradicating poverty and related human
deprivation. Donors and recipients have spent large sums of money to achieve MDG
goals and targets. While the world has met some MDG targets already, such as
halving extreme poverty and improving the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers,
many Sub-Saharan African countries are set to miss most of the targets because
they started with the worst initial conditions (Clemens et al., 2007; Easterly, 2009).
Fukuda-Parr et al. (2013) suggest that the criteria for success should focus on
the pace of progress rather than on the accomplishment of the targets. In fact, the
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authors find that African countries outperform global averages in progress toward
achieving the MDG targets. As stated by Easterly (2009), the MDG targets were set
up in a way that made it more unlikely that Africa would attain the targets than
other regions. For example, it is more diffcult for African countries to meet the target
of halving extreme poverty by the year 2015 because they had very low per capita
income in 1990, which is the base year for measuring MDG targets. Clemens et al.
(2007) argue that the MDGs are linked to the need for greater donor financing, and
hence, after 2015, the development effort could be weakened by the label of failure,
notwithstanding rapid progress by historical standards. In other words, numerical
targets with unreasonable expectations could be harmful because failure discourages
development efforts. To make numerical targets work, objective measures of develop
ment efforts and outcomes are needed.
To undertake a fair evaluation of outcomes, Fukuda-Parr et al. (2009) propose an
index that focuses on government obligations. They call it the economic and social
rights fulfillment (ESRF) index, which measures outcomes in, for example, food,
education, health, and work. The key feature of the proposed index is that it controls
for the resource capacity of a country using GDP per capita as a proxy. The ESRF
index shows that development achievement varies across countries with the same
level of income. In fact, while development outcomes measured by the MDG indica
tors are associated with income levels, the ESRF index gives relatively high ratings
to some low-income countries, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Togo, and
Liberia (Randolph et al, 2010).
The ESRF index focuses on government obligations for the realization of
economic and social rights. On the other hand, many other indicators, such as the
World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) and the International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG) indices, attempt to measure government quality, state capacity, or
governance.^^ The WGI and the ICRG indices are general and subjective measures,
which are based on perception-based expert surveys. Since the concept of good
governance is not well established, different experts may intend different things when
responding to the same question. As Fukuyama (2013) suggests, the existing surveys
ask whether corruption is pervasive in a country but do not measure how much
corrupt offcials provide services to clients in return. These governance measures
suffer from perceptual bias that influences the frequently discussed relationship
1) Fukuda-Parr et al. (2009) propose two approaches to consider resource capacity. One is the ratio approach,
which uses GDP per capita as a proxy for resource capacity. The other is the achievement possibilities
frontier approach, which uses the maximum level of achievement possible at a given per capita income level.
2) For the WGI, see Kaufmann et al. (2009). The indicators are available at the World Bank website, http://
info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx. See Howell (2007) for the ICRG indices.
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between growth and governance, as suggested by Kurtz and Schrank (2007) (i.e.,
growth spurs improvements in governance rather than vice versa).
When the indices are general and subjective, they cannot be signals of specific
things. Hence, general indicators do not give any information about why some coun
tries are better or worse performers and what is needed to improve governance. To
address this concern, Andrews et al. (2010) propose an indicator that focuses on
specific fields of engagement and outcomes. They use mortality rates for children
aged less than 5 years ("under-5 mortality rates"), adjusted for country income
groups, to show which countries have better governance in the field of child health.
Their approach draws attention to the relationship between costs and outcomes in
the specific field; if the survival rate for children under 5 years is the same and the
cost is lower in one country than another, the former country has better governance
in the field of child health. This is an objective measure of governance rather than
a general measure because it focuses on signals in the specific field. Hence, this
measure is more useful in helping to establish what to do for better governance.^^
However, there are still some concerns for fair international comparisons. The
MDG indicators, such as poverty headcount ratios and under-5 mortality rates, are
not subjective measures. Nonetheless, because initial conditions vary across countries,
cross-country comparisons are diffcult. As Easterly (2009) suggests, some countries
started at higher child mortality rates than others, and thus, they require greater
efforts to achieve the same goals. This implies that in order to evaluate development
efforts and outcomes adequately, we need to control for the initial level of each indi
cator.
This study attempts to develop objective indicators that measure outcomes as in
Andrews et al. (2010) and Fukuda-Parr et al. (2009). The key feature of this study's
approach is its focus on the relationship between development efforts and MDG
progress. While Andrews et al. (2010) and Fukuda-Parr et al. (2009) control for cost
and income, respectively, they do not control for initial conditions. Hence, their objec
tive indicators are less suitable for measuring MDG progress. This study controls for
the initial level of each sectoral indicator and evaluates 1) development efforts, 2)
MDG progress, and 3) the relationship between development efforts and MDG prog
ress. The third assessment measures state capacity and provides an objective indi
cator of governance for MDG progress.
3) In addition, several other studies use objective indicators to measure government performance. La Porta
et al. (1999) use data on infant mortality and school enrollment to measure public good provision. Knack
et al. (2003) suggest that data on government budgets could be useful to develop policy-relevant quantita
tive indicators of governance.
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The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 evaluates development efforts
by using data on input in each sector. Section 3 evaluates outcomes using the MDG
indicators. Section 4 examines the relationship between efforts and outcomes and
calculates governance scores in the education and the health sectors. Section 5
concludes.
2 Evaluating input
This section evaluates development efforts by using data on outlays by government
functions from the IMF's Government Finance Statistics (GFS) CD-ROM. I use data
for the following sectors: environmental protection (705), housing and community
amenities (706), health (707), education (709), and social protection (710). These
sectors are chosen on the basis of data availability. Since more countries use the
accrual method rather than the cash method, this study uses data based on the
former if both datasets are available. Data based on the cash method are used when
data based on the accrual method are not available. Data are available for 71 coun
tries from the early 1990s. However, there is limited availability of the GFS data for
developing countries. For many developing countries, data before 2000 are not avail
able.
The key feature of this study's evaluation is its comparison of efforts across
countries after controlling for development needs in each sector. Among countries
with similar levels of development needs, countries spending more receive higher
evaluations. For example, suppose that country A and country B have the same level
of under-5 mortality rate, which is an MDG indicator for the health sector. If the
health sector expenditure of country A is larger than that of country B, then country
A obtains a higher score in the sector.
To be more precise, this study uses the MDG indicators for each sector listed in
Table 1 to control for the initial development outcomes, which measure the needs of
development efforts.'" The MDG indicators are used to measure the outcomes of a
country on a scale from 1 to 10 using deciles. For each of the 10 scales, sectoral
outlay (the proportion of each sector's outlay in the total budget) is used to grade
development efforts on a scale from 1 to 5 using quintiles. For example, the education
sector has four indicators, such as persistence to last grade of primary school,
primary school completion rate, primary school enrollment, and ratio of female to
male primary school enrollment, as in Table 1. Then, there are four indicators to
4) Data on the MDG indicators are available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/.
31
measure development outcomes. For any of them, countries can be sorted into 10
groups (the bottom 10 percent,..., the top 10 percent). For each of the 10 groups,
development efforts are graded on a scale from 1 to 5 using GFS data. Thus, the
scores are based on a comparison among countries with similar initial conditions.
Since there are two or more indicators for each sector, efforts are first graded on a
scale from 1 to 5 using each of the indicators, and then, their geometric means are
calculated. By using geometric means, it is possible to reduce the impact of large
outliers and increase the effect of small ones.
For each of the five sectors, this study calculates the score of each country for
each year. Figure 1 shows the average scores for the period 1991-2000 (before the
MDGs) and the period 2001-2011 (after the MDGs), and for four income groups based
on GDP per capita: low income (Low), less than $1,000; lower-middle income (L.Mid),
$1,000 or more but less than $4,000; upper-middle income (U.Mid), $4,000 or more
but less than $10,000; high income (High), $10,000 or more. This study focuses on
changes before and after the MDGs for countries with GDP per capita of less than
$4,000. Figure 1 shows that scores of these countries drastically increase after the
MDGs in the following sectors: housing, education, and environment.^^ However, even
after the MDGs, scores for the social protection and health sectors are the lowest
among the low-income countries. Note that each MDG indicator measures the "rela
tive" need among countries in each year; the indicator value for a country changes
from year to year, even if the country is the most needy country in the world (the
absolute level of education improves almost everywhere after the MDGs). That is,
the level of education rises in some African countries, but still, they are among the
countries that need educational outlays the most. This implies that the group of
countries with the bottom 10 percent school enrollment ratio can include country A
in 1991 and the same country in 2011, even if this country raised the enrollment
ratio over 20 years. Hence, a higher score after the MDGs represents a rise in
development efforts in more needy countries.
Unfortunately, the availability of data on sectoral outlay is limited, especially in
developing countries. Moreover, many poor countries depend heavily on foreign aid.
Hence, to examine development efforts in developing countries, aid infiows should be
considered. If the sectoral allocation of aid matches the recipient country's needs, the
score based on aid data could measure development efforts in recipient countries.
Even if it does not match the recipient country's needs at all, the score can measure
development efforts by donors. While it is diffcult to obtain information about how
5) Outlays for the five sectors account for only a fraction of the total budget. Hence, a rise in one sector's
outlay does not necessarily reduce another sector's score (outlay).
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much aid allocation reflects the will of recipient countries, it is reasonable to assume
that to some degree, the sectoral allocation of aid reflects the recipient country's
priority. A significant advantage of using aid data is that refined classifications of
each project's purpose are available for many developing countries.
To calculate the scores for as many developing countries as possible, this study
uses sectoral data on aid from the OECD's Creditor Reporting System (CRS), which
reports aid amounts for more than 200 distinct purposes for all recipients.®^ This
study uses annual data on aid for the following sectors (CRS purpose codes are in
parentheses): education (11000-11999); health (12000-12999); population policies and
reproductive health (13000-13999); water supply and sanitation (14000-14999); social/
welfare services (16010); employment policy and administrative management (16020);
low-cost housing (16040); and general environmental protection (41000-41999). Total
sector allocable (11000-44999) is used as the denominator to calculate the proportion
of each sector in total aid."^^
Eight MDG-related sectors are chosen, as shown in Table 1. As before, the scores
of each country in each year are calculated. Figure 2 shows the average scores for
the eight sectors in the period 1991-2000 and the period 2001-2011 and for six
regions: East Asia and Pacific (EAR); Europe and Central Asia (EGA); Latin America
and the Caribbean (LCN); Middle East and North Africa (MEA); South Asia (SAS);
and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). In all sectors except water and sanitation in South
Asia, scores rise after the MDGs. This implies that aid inflows increase almost
everywhere (in any region or sector) after the MDGs, given the needs of development
efforts.
Figure 3 plots the relationship between the score and GDP per capita for each
country. In each sector, the top panel shows scores before the MDGs and the bottom
panel shows scores after the MDGs. For any given level of GDP per capita, scores
vary across countries. Note that, for countries with GDP per capita less than $4,000,
the mean, the median, and the mode increase after the MDGs in each sector; scores
for the majority of these countries are less than 3 before the MDGs but the median
score increases to more than 3 after the MDGs (except for the housing sector). Thus,
Figure 3 shows that aid goes to more needy countries. This is consistent with the
result of Alesina and Dollar (2000), even though they use aggregate aid data rather
than sectoral data.
6) Data are available for 191 countries and are obtained from the OECD's website, http://stats.oecd.org.
7) Aid for each of the eight sectors accounts for only a small fraction of the total aid. Hence, a rise in aid
for one sector does not necessarily imply a decrease in aid for another sector.
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3 Evaluating outcomes
This section evaluates outcomes in each sector and investigates whether a rise in
inputs after the MDGs positively affects outcomes. Earlier studies on aid effectiveness
have examined the impact of aid on growth. They show that aid inflows do not
promote growth unconditionally (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Roodman, 2007; Rajan
and Subramanian, 2008; Clemens et al., 2012). On the other hand, some studies
examine the impacts of aid on poverty and inequality rather than growth (Mosley
et al., 2004; Chong et al, 2009: Herzer and Nunnenkamp, 2012). Most of these studies
use aggregate data and do not examine how sectoral aid affects the MDG progress
of each sector.
The initial level of each MDG indicator varies across countries. Hence, it is diffcult
to assess the effect of development efforts on outcomes. As suggested by Easterly
(2009), halving extreme poverty is easier in countries that start with relatively low
levels of poverty (i.e., countries with many people just below the poverty line). To
address this issue, this section evaluates MDG progress over 2 (or 5) years after
controlling for the starting value. As in Section 2, this section compares countries
with similar initial conditions. While this approach uses the MDG indicators as in
Section 2, the purpose is to control for the starting value rather than the need for
development in each sector. In addition, it is important to note that the level of the
indicator changes from year to year, and hence, this approach controls for the "rela
tive" progress among countries at a point in time. The score is high for countries
with a relatively large improvement.
The MDG indicators in Table 1 are used to measure progress in each sector. For
example, the ratio of employment to population over the age of 15 years, which is
one of the MDG 1 indicators, is used to measure outcomes in employment. Sectoral
outcomes are measured as an improvement in the indicator over 2 years. Specifically,
to control for the initial value, this study sorts countries into 10 groups using deciles.
Then, for each of the 10 groups, improvements are graded on a scale from 1 to 5
using quintiles.
Figured plots the relationship between the score and GDP per capita for each
country. As in Section 2, the score of each country in each year is calculated, and
then, the period averages are shown. For each sector, the top panel shows scores
before the MDGs and the bottom panel shows scores after the MDGs.® Since the
8) Outcomes for the two sectors (the housing sector and the water and sanitation sector) in Figure 3 are not
reported. For the housing sector, two poverty measures are listed in Table 1. However, they are not the
specific outcome measures for this sector. For the water and sanitation sector, each of the two MDG
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starting values are controlled for, a high score is not necessarily a sign of progress
in absolute terms. In fact, Figure 4 does not show positive correlation between income
levels and scores; not only low- and lower middle-income countries have relatively
low scores in each sector but so do upper middle-income countries. Moreover, after
the MDGs, many Sub-Saharan African countries have high scores, especially in the
health sector. Low-income countries, such as Burkina Faso (BFA), Ethiopia (ETH),
Liberia (LBR), Malawi (MWI), Mali (MLI), Niger (NER), Rwanda (RWA), and
Tanzania (TZA), score 4 or higher for both (d) the under-5 mortality rate and (e)
the prevalence of HIV in Table 4.
In addition. Figure 4 shows that the median scores of low- and lower middle-
income countries increase after the MDGs for (a) poverty headcount, (b) vulnerable
employment, and (e) prevalence of HIV. On the other hand, there is no clear improve
ment in the scores for (c) persistence to last grade, (d) under-5 mortality rate, and
(f) CO2 emissions. As is shown clearly in Figures 1-3, inputs for the corresponding
sectors increase. Qualitatively similar results are obtained when examining improve
ments over 5 years and when controlling for economic growth (not reported owing
to space constraints). Thus, while the MDGs facilitate development efforts, their
rewards do not increase in some sectors. Unfortunately, the decreasing returns to
efforts are observed for the education, health, and environment sectors in low- and
lower middle-income countries.
4 Governance in high-priority sectors
This section examines the relationship between development efforts (inputs) and
MDG progress (outcomes) in each sector. As discussed in Section 2, development
efforts increase after the MDGs in most sectors. However, as shown in Section 3,
there is no clear improvement in outcomes for some sectors. Clearly, there are many
possible reasons for this. Funds may not be used for intended beneficiaries in coun
tries with weak governance. In some countries, funds are used for intended
beneficiaries but some characteristics of the country, such as geography and climate
conditions, may increase the unit cost of improving outcomes. In this case, efforts
are not necessarily consistent with outcomes. Most governments in poor countries
disburse some money for major sectors, such as education and health, but in many
cases, the funds are too low to achieve goals. If the task is not a high-priority one
for the country, inputs can be negligible. Outlays would be effective only in countries
indicators cannot be a single outcome measure for the sector because in Section 2, the water and sanita
tion sectors are combined.
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that truly were committed to the target.
This section focuses on high-priority sectors in each country and examines
whether positive effects of development efforts are observed. First, a priority sector
is defined as a sector that experienced a large increase in inputs over the last 2
years. As in Section 2, inputs are measured using GFS and CRS data in Table 1,
while changes in inputs rather than levels are used. In particular, a high-priority
sector is defined as that whose input growth is in the top 40 percent of countries.
Because this is defined based on relative growth in sectoral inputs among countries,
each country can have two or more high-priority sectors and these can change from
year to year. Second, for each high-priority sector, progress is graded over the
following 2 years on a scale from 1 to 5 (after controlling for the starting value), as
in Section 3. Then, this study determines whether the country's governance is good
in each high-priority sector as follows: governance is good when the country's score
is 4 or 5. Finally, governance scores are calculated as the percentage of good gover
nance in all high-priority sectors.
Table 2 shows the results for the education and health sectors. As shown in
Sections 2 and 3, there is little improvement in outcomes for these two sectors while
inputs increase drastically after the MDGs. As in Table 1, each sector has two or
more MDG indicators, and hence, governance can be defined using each of the MDG
indicators. For the education sector, persistence to last grade of primary school (MDG
2), primary school completion rate (MDG 2), primary school enrollment (MDG 2),
and ratio of female to male primary school enrollment (MDG 3) are chosen to
measure progress; for the health sector, under-5 mortality rate (MDG 4), incidence
of tuberculosis (MDG 6), and prevalence of HIV (MDG 6) are chosen. In Table 2, the
figures indicate the number of times that the sector is determined to have good
governance during the period 2001-2011. The figures in parentheses indicate the
number of times that the sector is deemed to be a high-priority sector.
Figures plots the relationship between GDP per capita and governance scores
(the percentage of good governance in all high-priority sectors) in the education and
health sectors. Persistence to last grade of primary school and under-5 mortality rate
are used as outcome measures in the education and health sectors, respectively. Some
countries whose GDP per capita is less than $4,000 have high scores. For example,
in the left panel of Figure 5, the scores of six countries, namely, Kiribati (KIR),
Ecuador (ECU), Albania (ALB), Marshall Islands (MHL), Swaziland (SWZ), and Sao
Tome and Principe (STP), are 0.5 or higher. Similarly, in the right panel of Figure 5,
the scores of eight countries, namely, Nepal (NPL), Belarus (BLR), Zambia (ZMB),
Senegal (SEN). Cambodia (KHM), Malawi (MWI), Rwanda (RWA), and Niger (NER),
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are higher than 0.5. Thus, some countries with relatively low income have experi
enced large improvements in their high-priority sectors. This result suggests that it
is important to control for the starting value to assess MDG progress.
Finally, this study compares governance scores depicted in Figure 5 with the
WGI, which is a popular perception-based measure. The WGI percentile ranks range
from 0 (lowest) to ICQ (highest). The WGI percentile ranks for high-scoring lower-
income countries in Figure 5 are as follows: government effectiveness and regulatory
quality are 24 and 7 for Kiribati, 4 and 19 for Marshall Islands, 28 and 28 for
Swaziland, 27 and 25 for Sao Tome and Principe, 13 and 9 for Belarus, 18 and 26
for Nepal, and 20 and 32 for Cambodia. These countries, which include Sub-Saharan
African countries, have low WGI scores but high governance scores in this study.
Figure 5 does not suggest a positive relationship between governance and GDP
per capita, although Kaufmann et al. (1999) show a significant positive relationship
between their WGI and GDP per capita. They suggest that good governance has a
positive effect on GDP per capita but other studies, such as La Porta et al. (1999)
and Kurtz and Schrank (2007), show that GDP per capita affects the quality of
governance. Regardless of causality, an association between income and governance
indicators (e.g., WGI) is observed. This implies that it is important to control for
income levels when governance indicators are used to evaluate development outcomes.
Controlling for initial conditions and focusing on specific sectors are required for a
fair evaluation of MDG progress.
5 Conclusions
This study assesses development efforts, outcomes, and the relationship between
efforts and outcomes using the MDG indicators for each sector. The results show
that development efforts increase after the MDGs in many social sectors. However,
increases in efforts do not necessarily contribute to outcomes. There is no clear
improvement in outcomes for the education, health, and environment sectors, in which
inputs clearly increase in relatively poor countries. As suggested in Clemens et al.
(2007) and Easterly (2009), many Sub-Saharan African countries will miss most of
the MDG targets by 2015 because they started with the worst initial conditions, not
because they did not truly commit to the targets. The results of this study show
that, after controlling for starting values, outcome scores vary across countries and
some Sub-Saharan African countries have experienced large improvements. Thus,
controlling for starting values is required for a fair evaluation of MDG progress.
In addition, this study constructs governance indices based on the effort-outcome
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relationship in each sector. Unlike the WGIs, there is little correlation between gover
nance scores and income levels. Again, the results show that scores vary across
countries and even low-income countries can obtain high scores. As Andrews et al.
(2010) suggest, a governance measure should focus on specific outcomes, such as
under-5 mortality, because a general measure cannot help to establish what to do for
better governance. Unlike those indices, this study controls for starting values
because countries with higher child mortality rates need to make greater efforts to
achieve the same goals. Moreover, this study focuses on each country's high-priority
sectors, which have experienced sharp increases in inputs. In this way, the indices
can measure the capacity of states to address momentous issues on limited budgets.
Thus, the approach of this study contributes to fair evaluation of MDG progress and
proper design of post-2015 targets.
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Table 1: Sectoral inputs and MDG indicators
Development efforts MDG indicators
1. Social protection
Social Protection (GFS710) Malnutrition, % of children under 5 (MDG 1)
Social/Welfare services (CRS 16010) Undernourishment, % of population (MDG 1)
2. Employment
Employment policy (CRS 16020) Employment to population over 15 (MDG l)
Self-employed. % of total employed (MDG 1)
Vulnerable employment, % of total employed (MDG 1)
(Unpaid family workers and own-account workers)
3. Housing
Housing and community amenities (GFS 706) Poverty gap at $1.25 a day (MDG 1)
Low-cost housing (CRS 16040) Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day (MDG 1)
4. Education
Education (GFS 709) Persistence to last grade of primary school (MDG 2)
Education (CRS 11000-11999) Primary school completion rate (MDG 2)
Primary school enrollment (MDG 2)
Ratio of female to male primary school enrollment (MDG 3)
5. Population
Population policies. Adolescent fertility (MDG 5)
including HIV/AIDS control Maternal mortality (MDG 5)
(CRS 13000-13999) Prevalence of HIV (MDG 6)
6. Health
Health (GFS 707) Under-5 mortality rate (MDG 4)
Health (CRS 12000-12999) Incidence of tuberculosis (MDG 6)
7. Environment
Environmental protection (GFS 705) CO2 emissions, kt (MDG 7)
General environmental protection CO2 emissions, metric tons per capita (MDG 7)
(CRS 41000-41999) Forest area, % of land area (MDG 7)
8. Water and sanitation
Water supply and sanitation Improved sanitation facilities (MDG 7)
(CRS 14000-14999) Improved water source (MDG 7)
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Table 2: Good governance
Number of good governance 2001-2011
Country Code Region El E2 E3 E4 HI H2 H3
Afghanistan AFG SAS 2 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9)
Angola AGO SSA 0 (I) 0 (2) 0 (2) 0 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9)
Albania ALB EGA 2(4) 0 (I) 0 (I) 0 (I) I (9) 1 (9)
Argentina ARG LCN 1 (7) 0 (8) 0 (I) 0 (8) 0 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9)
Armenia ARM ECA I (4) 3 (5) I (4) 3 (7) 2 (9) I (9) 0 (9)
Antigua and Barbuda ATG LAC 0 (2) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (9) I (9)
Azerbaijan AZE ECA I (9) 0 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9) 1 (9) 3 (9) 0 (9)
Burundi BDI SSA I (7) I (7) 2 (8) 2 (9) 0 (9) 4 (9) 4 (9)
Benin BEN SSA 0(2) 2 (3) 0 (3) 2 (7) 4 (9) 0 (9) 4 (9)
Burkina Faso BFA SSA 0(8) 2 (8) 4 (9) 4 (9) 3 (9) 1 (9) 4 (9)
Bangladesh BGD SAS 0 (2) 0 (2) 1 (5) 4(9) 0 (9) 0 (9)
Bahrain BHR MEA I (I) 0 (4) 0 (4)
Bosnia and Herzegovina BIH ECA 0(I) 0 (9) 0 (9)
Belarus BLR ECA 0(3) 0 (3) 0 (2) I (3) 2 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3)
Belize BLZ LCN 0(4) I (8) I (8) 0 (8) 0 (9) 0 (9) I (9)
Bolivia BOL LCN 0(3) 0 (5) 0 (3) I (7) 2 (9) 2 (9) 0 (9)
Brazil BRA LCN 2 (9) 2 (9)
Barbados BRB LCN 1 (4) 3 (9) 3 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9) 3 (9) 0 (9)
Bhutan BTN SAS I (7) 4 (6) 2 (3) 5 (9) 2 (9) 2 (9) 0 (9)
Botswana BWA SSA 0(3) 2 (7) 0 (7) 0 (7) 2 (9) 4 (9) 4 (9)
Central African Republic CAE SSA 0(2) 0 (6) 0 (5) 0 (9) 0 (9) 3 (9)
Chile CHL LCN 0 (I) 0 (3) 2(8) 0 (9) 0 (9) 2 (9)
China CHN EAR 0 (5) 4 (9) 4 (9)
Cote d'lvoire CIV SSA 0(I) 0 (2) 0 (1) 0(4) 0 (9) 3 (9) 3 (9)
Cameroon CMR SSA 0(4) 0 (7) 0 (9) 3 (9) 2 (9) I (9)
Congo, Rep. COG SSA 1 (9) I (9) 0 (9) 1 (9) 3 (9)
Colombia COL LCN 0(4) 1 (7) 0 (5) I (7) 0 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9)
Comoros COM SSA 0(1) 0 (1) 0 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9)
Cape Verde CPV SSA 0(8) 0 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9) I (9) 0 (9) 2 (9)
Costa Rica CRT LCN I (5) I (7) I (7) 0 (9) 2 (9) 0 (9)
Cuba CUB LCN 0(9) I (9) I (9) I (9) 0 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9)
Djibouti DJI MEA 0 (I) 2 (6) I (6) 0 (9) 0 (9) 5 (9)
Dominica DMA LCN I (8) 0 (9) 0 (8) 0 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9)
Dominican Republic DOM LCN 1 (4) 1 (8) 0 (8) 0 (9) 2 (9) 2 (9)
Algeria DZA MEA 0(7) 3 (9) 3 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9)
Ecuador ECU LCN 2(4) 2 (5) 0 (7) 1 (7) 0 (9) 4 (9) 0 (9)
Egypt EGY MEA I (4) 0 (7) I (7) 2 (7) 2 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9)
Eritrea ERI SSA 0(7) 2 (8) 0 (9) 0 (9) 2 (9) 4 (9) 4 (9)
Ethiopia ETH SSA 0(9) 1 (9) 2 (9) 2 (9) 3 (9) 3 (9) 3 (9)
Fiji FJI EAR 0(I) 0 (4) 0 (6) I (6) 0 (9) 3 (9) 0 (9)
Micronesia FSM EAR 1 (I) 0 (9) 4 (9)
Gabon GAB SSA 0 (1) 0 (9) 3 (9) 3 (9)
Georgia GEO ECA 1 (8) 0 (8) I (4) I (9) 0 (9) 4 (9) 0 (9)
Ghana GHA SSA 1 (8) 0 (8) 0 (8) I (9) 6 (9) 5 (9)
Guinea GIN SSA 1 (6) 3 (8) 2 (9) 3 (9) 3 (9) 2 (9) 0 (9)
Gambia GMB SSA 0(6) 1 (9) 0 (9) 1 (9) 3 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9)
Guinea-Bissau GNB SSA 0 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9)
Equatorial Guinea GNQ SSA 0(2) I (3) 0 (3) 0 (4) 0 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9)
Grenada GRD LCN 0 (4) I (3) 2 (6) 0 (9) 0 (9)
Guatemala GTM LCN 0(5) I (7) 0 (7) I (7) 0 (9) 0 (9) I (9)
Guyana GUY LCN I (7) 0 (2) 3 (7) 0 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9)
Honduras HND LCN 0(4) 0 (4) 1 (7) 1 (7) 0 (9) 4 (9) 4 (9)
Croatia HRV ECA 0(4) I (7) I (7) 0 (7) 0 (9) 0 (9)
Haiti HTI LCN 0 (9) 2 (9) I (9)
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Country Code Region El E2 E3 E4 HI H2 H3
Indonesia IDN EAR 1 (4) 0 (9) 0 (9) I (9) 0 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9)
India IND SAS 0 (2) 0 (4) 1 (4) 2 (9) 1 (9) 0 (9)
Iran IRN MEA 0(2) 0 (9) 2 (6) 3 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9)
Iraq IRQ MEA 0 (9) 0 (9)
Jamaica JAM LCN 0 (I) 0 (2) 0 (2) 0 (9) 0 (9) 2 (9)
Jordan JOR MEA 0(2) 1 (5) 0 (6) 0 (6) 0 (9) 0 (9)
Kazakhstan KAZ ECA 0(9) 0 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9) 2 (9) 2 (9)
Kenya KEN SSA I (7) 1 (7) 1 (9) 2 (9) 3 (9)
Kyrgyz KGZ ECA 0(9) 1 (9) 0 (9) 1 (9) 0 (9) 6 (9) 0 (9)
Cambodia KHM EAP 1 (5) 1 (9) 0 (2) I  (9) 5 (9) 6 (9) 6 (9)
Kiribati KIR EAP 1 (1) 0 (6) 0 (7) 0 (9) 4 (9)
St.Kitts and Nevis KNA LCN 1 (1) 2 (7) 1 (7) I (7) 2 (9) 3 (9)
Lao PDR LAO EAP 0(9) 2 (9) 1 (9) I (9) 3 (9) 4 (9) 0 (9)
Lebanon LBN MEA 2(7) 0 (9) 0 (7) 0 (9) 3 (9) 0 (9)
Liberia LBR SSA 1 (1) 0 (2) 1 (2) 4 (9) 0 (9) 4 (9)
Libya LBY MEA 0 (3) 0 (3)
St.Lucia LCA LCN 0(2) 1 (8) 1 (9) 1 (9) 0 (9) 3 (9)
Sri Lanka LKA SAS 0 (7) 0 (9) 1 (9) 2 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9)
Lesotho LSO SSA 2(9) I (9) I (9) 0 (9) 0 (9) 1 (9) 2 (9)
Morocco MAR MEA 1 (9) 2 (9) I (9) 0 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9)
Moldova MDA ECA 1 (9) 2 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9) 2 (9) 0 (9)
Madagascar MDG SSA 1 (9) 2 (9) 0 (I) I  (9) 3 (9) 1 (9) 2 (9)
Maldives MDV SAS 0 (7) 0 (5) 0 (7) 4 (9) 2 (9) 0 (9)
Mexico MEX LCN 2(8) 1 (9) 3 (9) 5 (9) 0 (9) 2 (9) 0 (9)
Marshall Islands MHL EAP I (2) 1 (5) 3 (7) 0 (9) 0 (9)
Macedonia MKD ECA 1 (4) 0 (7) 1 (8) 0 (8) 2 (9) 2 (9)
Mali MLI SSA 0(7) 2 (9) 2 (6) 2 (9) 3 (9) 0 (9) 3 (9)
Malta MLT MEA 0 (2) 1 (2) 0 (2) 0 (2) 0 (2)
Myanmar MMR EAP 1 (2) 3 (6) 2 (6) 0 (9) 5 (9) 2 (9)
Montenegro MNE ECA 0 (2) 2 (6) 2 (6) 0 (5)
Mongolia MNG EAP 0(2) I (5) 2 (9) 0 (9) 2 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9)
Mozambique MOZ SSA 0(6) 2 (7) 2 (7) I (7) 3 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9)
Mauritania MRT SSA 0(2) 0 (2) I (9) 2 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9)
Mauritius MUS SSA 1 (9) 0 (9) 2 (9) 1 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9)
Malawi MWI SSA 1 (6) 1 (7) 0 (5) 0 (7) 5 (9) 5 (9) 5 (9)
Malaysia MYS EAP 1 (5) 2 (2) I (3) 0 (3) 0 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9)
Namibia NAM SSA 0(3) 0 (8) 0 (8) 0 (8) 2 (9) 3 (9) 3 (9)
Niger NER SSA 0(4) I (9) 2 (9) 1 (9) 5 (9) 5 (9) 4 (9)
Nigeria NGA SSA 0(4) I (5) 0 (5) 1 (6) 3 (9) 4(9) 1 (9)
Nicaragua NIC LCN 0(5) 0 (7) 2 (5) 0 (7) 0 (9) 4 (9) 0 (9)
Nepal NPL SAS 0 (1) 0 (5) 5 (9) 6 (9) 0 (9) 2 (9)
Oman OMN MEA 1 (2) 0 (2) 0 (6) 2 (9) 1 (9)
Pakistan PAK SAS 0(2) 0 (5) 2 (8) 5 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9)
Panama PAN LCN 1 (6) 0 (7) 0 (7) 0 (7) 0 (9) 0 (9) 3 (9)
Peru PER LCN 0(3) 0 (4) I (9) 0 (9) 1 (9) 3 (9) 2 (9)
Philippines PHL EAP 1 (6) 0 (7) 0 (7) 0 (7) 0 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9)
Palau PLW EAP 0 (9) 1 (9)
Papua New Guinea PNG EAP 0 (1) 0 (5) 0 (9) 1 (9) 0 (9)
Korea, Dem. Rep. PRK EAP 0 (9) 0 (9)
Paraguay PRY LCN 1 (6) 2 (8) 0 (8) 2 (8) 0 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9)
Rwanda RWA SSA 0(2) 0 (3) I (3) 0 (9) 5 (9) 5 (9) 3 (9)
Saudi Arabia SAU MEA I (I) I (2) 2 (7) 0 (7)
Sudan SDN SSA 0 (9) 1 (9)
Senegal SEN SSA 0(7) 2 (9) 1 (7) 3 (9) 5 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9)
Solomon Islands SLB EAP 0 (I) 0 (1) 0 (9) 4 (9)
Sierra Leone SLE SSA 0 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9)
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Number of good governance 2001-2011
E2 E3 E4 HI H2 H3
El Salvador SLV LCN 0(4) 0(7) 0(7) 0(9) 2(9) 0(9) 1 (9)
Somalia SOM SSA 0(9) 0(9) 0 (9)
Sao Tome and Principe STP SSA 1 (2) 3(6) 1 (5) 2(6) 2(9) 0(9) 2 (9)
Suriname SUR LCN 0(1) 0 (4) 0(4) 0(4) 0(9) 3(9) 1 (9)
Slovenia SVN ECA 0(2) 0(2) 0(2)
Swaziland swz SSA 1 (2) 1 (7) I (5) 0(7) 1 (9) 0(9) 0 (9)
Seychelles SYC SSA 1 (2) 1 (7) 0(4) 0(7) 0(9) 0(9)
Syrian Arab Republic SYR MEA 1 (8) 1 (9) 1 (8) 3(9) 2(9) 1 (9)
Turks and Caicos Islands TCA LCN 1 (1) 1 (2) 2(2) 0(7)
Chad TCD SSA 0(2) 1 (5) 0(1) 0(9) 0(9) 0(9) 1 (9)
Togo TGO SSA 0(4) 0(6) 1 (6) 1 (9) 0(9) 0(9) 2 (9)
Thailand THA EAP 2(2) 1 (5) 1 (9) 4(9) 3 (9)
Tajikistan TJK ECA 1 (9) 2(9) 1 (9) 2(9) 0 (9) 2(9) 0 (9)
Turkmenistan TKM ECA 1 (9) 5(9)
Tonga TON EAP 0(1) 1 (9) 0(9) 1 (9)
Trinidad and Tobago TTO LCN 0 (1) 0(5) 2(6) 0(6) 0(9) 0(9) 0 (9)
Tunisia TUN MEA 0(2) 2(3) 1 (9) 3(9) 1 (9) 0(9) 0 (9)
Turkey TUR ECA 2(6) 1 (6) 2(9) 2(9) 1 (9) 1 (9)
Tuvalu TUV EAP 1 (4) 0(4) 0(9) 3(9)
Tanzania TZA SSA 0(4) 0(4) 2(5) 0(8) 3(9) 3(9) 3 (9)
Uganda UGA SSA 0(5) 0(7) 0(1) 2(9) 4 (9) 4(9) 1 (9)
Ukraine UKR ECA 0(3) 0(3) 0(3) 0(3) 0(3) 0(3) 0 (3)
Uruguay URY LCN 0(7) 0(8) 0(4) 0(8) 1 (9) 0(9) 0 (9)
Uzbekistan UZB ECA 0(8) 1 (9) 0(3) 1 (9) 0(9) 5 (9) 2 (9)
St.Vincent and the Grenadines VCT LCN 1 (3) 0(7) 1 (7) 0(9) 0(9)
Venezuela VEN LCN 2(9) 3(9) 3(9) 0 (9) 0(9) 0(9) 0 (9)
Vietnam VNM EAP 0(2) 0(3) 2(7) 0(9) 3(9) 0 (9)
Vanuatu VUT EAP 0(1) 0(2) 1 (3) 1 (8) 0(9) 2(9)
Samoa WSM EAP 1 (3) 2(7) 0(2) 0(7) 0(9) 0(9)
Yemen YEM MEA 0(2) 0(4) 2(3) 2 (4) 1 (9) 2(9) 0 (9)
South Africa ZAP SSA 0(1) 1 (I) 0(7) 0(7) 0(9) 0(9) 0 (9)
Zambia ZMB SSA 0(2) 2(6) 2(7) 2(7) 5(9) 5 (9) 5 (9)
Zimbabwe ZWE SSA 0(1) 0(1) 0(1) 0(9) 2(9) 3 (9)
Note: Figures in parentheses are the number of high-priority sectors. E1-E4 (for education) and H1-H3 (for
health) represent scores based on the following indicators.
El: Persistence to last grade of primary school (MDG 2)
E2: Primary school completion rate (MDG 2)
E3: Primary school enrollment (MDG 2)
E4: Ratio of female to male primary enrollment (MDG 3)
HI: Under-5 mortality rate (MDG 4)
H2: Incidence of tuberculosis (MDG 6)
H3: Prevalence of HIV (MDG 6)
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